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Abstract
This article presents Roman Ingarden’s theory of causa-
tion, as developed in volume III of The Controversy about
the Existence of the World, and defends an alternative
which uses some important insights of Ingarden. It re-
jects Ingarden’s claim that a cause is simultaneous with
its effect and that a cause necessitates its effect. It uses
Ingarden’s notion of ‘inclinations’ and accepts Ingarden’s
claim that an event cannot necessitate a later event.
1 Introduction
Roman Ingarden’s four volume work The Controversy about the
Existence of the World (German: ‘Der Streit um die Existenz der
Welt’, Polish: ‘Spór o istnienie świata’) on ontology and meta-
physics has received little attention. One has to admit that it
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would be more accessible if it were shorter and better structured.
But it contains philosophical insights which can help us to see
the limits and unquestioned presuppositions of our contemporary
Anglosaxon philosophical debates. In this article I shall present
Ingarden’s theory of causation, criticise it, and present an al-
ternative which takes into account some of Ingarden’s insights.
Before this I shall draw your attention to some presuppositions of
the contemporary debate about causation which Ingarden does
not share.
In the first volume of the Streit (1947; 1964) Ingarden develops
various notions of ontological dependence. In the second volume
(1948; 1965; 1965) (which consists of two books, volume II/1 and
volume II/2) he investigates the ontological structure of various
types of entities.1 Amongst these he investigates also ‘intentional
objects’, of which the characters in a novel are examples. They
depend in their existence in a certain sense on the author of the
novel. By comparing these kinds of objects with ‘autonomous in-
dividual objects’, Ingarden wants to bring out that the real world
is not like figures of a novel dependent on a conscious subject but
has independent being. He develops this in order to bring out the
error in Edmund Husserl’s idealism which ascribes to the world
‘purely intentional being’.2 So the reason wherefore the work is
called ‘The Controversy about the Existence of the World’ is that
it aims to clarify the question in which way the world exists. The
third volume of the Streit presents a theory of causation and of
‘the causal structure of the real world’. The unfinished German
manuscript was published in 1974, four years after his death. (In-
garden 1974; page numbers in the following refor to this work.)
A translation into Polish appeared in 1981. (Ingarden 1981)
1(Wachter 2005) gives a survey of Ingarden’s ontology.
2On Husserl’s and Ingarden’s notions of ‘intentional objects’ see Chrudz-
imski 2005.
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2 Roman Ingarden’s theory of the causal
structure of the world
2.1 Ingarden uses no linguistic methods
In order to understand Ingarden’s theory of causation, read-
ers whose background is the contemporary Anglosaxon debate
about causation need to take into account that Ingarden does not
use linguistic or conceptual methods, no paraphrasing of state-
ments, no search for ‘ontological commitments’. Contemporary
Anglosaxon philosophers usually assume either that the philo-
sophical task concerning causation is to analyze or define the
concept of a cause, or that one can find out something about
causation by analyzing or defining the concept of a cause. Al-
ready David Hume assumed one or both of these claims. Let me
sketch this in order to bring out what Ingarden is doing and what
he is not doing.
Hume claimed that that ‘all our ideas [. . . ] are copies of our
impressions’ (Enquiry, § 13) and that one finds the meaning of
a word by looking for sense impressions of which it is a copy.
Therefore he started his investigation of causation by considering
whether we have sense impressions of ‘causal connexions’. His
negative answer lead him to the claim that the expression ‘causal
connexion’ is ‘absolutely without any meaning’. (Enquiry, § 58)
However, Hume seems to recognise that this is not true and that
we do have the idea of a causal connection, because he suggests
that the origin of our idea of a causal connection is that when we
observe that events of one kind A are always followed by events
of the kind B, then we get used to this and begin to imagine
that there is a causal connexion. Hume says nothing about the
contradiction between this and his assumption that all our ideas
are copies of impressions. We must reconstrue this as the view
that all good (reliable or useful) ideas are copies of impressions.
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Having explained how we develop the idea of a causal connec-
tion, Hume then moves on to say that as we have no experience
of causal connexions but only of regular sequences of events, we
may, ‘suitably to this experience’, ‘define a cause to be an object,
followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first
are followed by objects similar to the second.’ (Enquiry, § 60)
Hume does not explain why he defines ‘cause’ without reference
to causal connections although we do have the concept of a causal
connection. He must mean that his definition of a cause somehow
purges the concept of unjustified beliefs.
Many have questioned Hume’s claim that we have no sense im-
pressions of causal connections, because pressure on our skin can
plausibly be taken to be a sense impression of a causal connection.
But what is even more dubious is the move from ‘We experience
no causal connexions’ to defining ‘cause’ without reference to
causal connexions, and then apparently to the assumption that
there are no causal connections. Hume’s method of finding the
meaning of a word by looking for sense impressions is obviously
wrong. Rather, we find it by observing how the word is used and
by thinking about the meaning of the word and about possible
cases of its usage. Obviously Hume’s definition is not designed
to define the meaning of ‘cause’ as we actually use the word, but
he does not tell us what it is supposed to do instead.
Furthermore, we need to ask whether Hume’s definition of
‘cause’ supports the claim that there are no causal connections.
How should providing a definition of the meaning of a word entail
any interesting philosophical existence claim? Hume is generally
taken to have denied the existence of causal connections, but
some have questioned this. (E. g. Strawson 1989) The cause of
this controversy is that Hume does not explicitly say whether
there are causal connections, let alone how providing a definition
of a cause should support a claim about the existence of causal
connections.
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A reader who is used to such Humean, conceptual methods or
to contemporary linguistic methods will need to be aware that
Ingarden uses no such methods. He does not undertake to define
or analyse the concept of a cause, he does not investigate the
origin of the concept of a cause. More generally, he does not be-
long to those philosophers who assume that philosophy does not
look into the world and at things in themselves, but only at con-
cepts, transcendental categories, logical forms, forms of thought,
sense data, or language. Ingarden wants to investigate things as
they are in themselves, independently of whether and how they
are conceived or described.3 In the contemporary debate about
causation an important task is to look for counterexamples to
proposed definitions of ‘cause’. Ingarden is not concerned with
this because his aim is not to produce a definition. His aim is
to describe what causation is—not in the sense of what we mean
by ‘cause’, but in the sense of describing what happens when one
event causes another one.
In the four volumes of The Controversy about the Existence
of the World Ingarden does not use the word ‘phenomenology’
often, but he clearly assumes two main claims of phenomenology:
First, the task of philosophy is not mainly to analyze or define
concepts; second, contrary to empiricism, not all our knowledge
comes through sense experience. And of course, Ingarden does
not assume that we find the meaning of a word through looking
for sense impressions of which the meaning is a copy, or that one
needs an account of the origin of a concept in order to be justified
in using it.
3For example, when he investigates what a substance is, he says that he
wants to investigate things as they are inthemselves, ‘not in the relative
aspect which a being has as the object of a conscious act of referring to it’
and without any ‘epistemological aspect’. (Ingarden 1965a, p. 62)
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2.2 Causes are simultaneous with their effect
While Ingarden recognises that before Hume all causes were gen-
erally taken to be things or ‘substances’ (Ingarden 1974, p. 25),
he argues that causes as well as effects are events or processes.
By an event Ingarden means a change occurring in a moment. A
moment, however, is not a point in time. Rather, it is a ‘mini-
mum of lasting’, which is distinct from zero. (49) The beginning
and end of a process are events. Likewise the crossing of processes
are events.
The most striking feature of Ingarden’s theory of event cau-
sation is that it claims that causes are simultaneous with their
effects. More precisely, it distinguishes between ‘immediate’ and
‘mediate’ causes, where the former occur simultaneously with
their effects while the latter occur earlier than their effects. Me-
diate causes always act through immediate causes.
What we call the cause of an event usually is not all that con-
tributed to the causing. Some authors say that it is only a part
of the whole cause, others say that some of the other events con-
stitute the ‘conditions’ under which the causing occurs. Ingarden
takes the latter line: an immediate cause is the last one of a set of
events which together necessitate the effect. It is the triggering
factor. The other events together with the cause constitute the
‘sufficient condition’ for the effect.
The cause is only the temporally last element of the
active sufficient condition of an event. This condition
consists of many factors. The cause makes the con-
dition complete and activates it, while before the al-
ready existing factors were inactive in that they could
not bring about the effect in question. (53, similarly
88)
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2.3 The mechanism of causation is ontological
dependence
Ingarden’s reason for taking immediate causes to be simultaneous
with their effects is that otherwise there could be no ‘connection
of being’ (‘Seinszusammenhang’) between them (Ingarden 1974,
p. 44). There would be a ‘gap’ between them. The second event
could not originate in the first. (45) There can only be a connec-
tion of being between actually existing things, and an event that
is past does not actually exist anymore. (64 f) And why, Ingar-
den asks, should the effect occur later than the cause? How could
there be a delay? (47, 62) There can only be a delay if something
which is needed for the causing is yet missing. If the cause is
complete, then the effect occurs immediately and simultaneously
with the cause.
Behind this argument lies the assumption that an effect is ne-
cessitated. It is a part of an ‘active, sufficient condition’ (53,
similarly 61 and 171), which is a set of events or states which
together necessitate the effect. That is, it is impossible that it
occurs while the effect does not occur. Ingarden uses the word
‘sufficient’ here, like Leibniz and like most authors today, not in
the sense of ‘enough’, but in the sense of ‘necessitating’.4 If an
event really necessitates another event, then it must occur at the
same time as the event necessitated. The second event could only
occur later if something was yet missing. I shall argue below that
this is a true and very important insight, although I shall suggest
that the right way to take it into account is to deny that a cause
necessitates its effect.
Of course, by necessity Ingarden does not mean what is called
today ‘logical necessity’. There is no contradiction in the descrip-
tion of the sufficient condition and the denial of the occurrence
4Leibniz was, in my view rightly, criticised for this by Crusius 1744. Cf.
Wachter 2009, § 5.6.
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of the effect. Ingarden assumes that the word ‘impossible’ in ‘It
is impossible that C occurs while E does not occur’ has its own
meaning which is distinct from the meaning of ‘contradictory’
and is not reducible to something else.5
In Streit I Ingarden distinguished carefully four senses of on-
tological dependence:
∙ That an entity is existentially heteronomous (‘seinsheteronom’)
means that the fundament of its being is not in entirely in
the entity. For example, Fjodor Karamasov is existentially
heteronomous because his fundament of being is in the au-
thor, Dostojevski.
∙ That an entity is existentially derived (‘seinsabgeleitet’)
means that, because of its essence, it can be created by
another entity. An existentially original entity (‘seinsur-
sprünglich’) is one whose essence forces it to exist and which
therefore exists at all times, it is imperishable, it exists nec-
essarily. God is such an entity. A materialist might hold
that there is matter that is existentially original.
∙ That an entity x is existentially non-self-sufficient upon y
means that it can only exist together with y in the unity
of a whole thing. The properties of a thing, which Ingar-
den takes to be not universals but individuals (today many
call them ‘tropes’, Husserl and Ingarden called them ‘Mo-
mente’), are existentially non-self-sufficient upon that thing
and upon some of the other properties of that thing because
they cannot exist without being in that thing, together with
some of its other properties.
5For an explication and defence of this understanding of necessity, see
Wachter 2000.
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∙ That an entity x is existentially dependent upon y means
that it is not existentially non-self-sufficient upon y but that
it requires for its existence the existence of y.6
Of course, Ingarden does not accept the Humean principle that
distinct entities are independent from each other, i. e. if x and y
are wholly distinct, then x can exist without y. For example,
while empiricists usually hold that the properties of a thing are
independent from each other (e. g. Campbell 1990, p. 21), Ingar-
den holds that each property of a thing (which he takes to be
not universals but individuals) is existentially non-self-sufficient
upon many of the thing’s other properties.
Ingarden points out that a cause and its effect are not exis-
tentially non-self-sufficient upon each other. (16) They are not
parts of a whole in the way in which the properties of a thing
are parts of the whole thing. But Ingarden assumes that there
is ‘existential dependence’ between cause and effect. An effect
is not existentially dependent upon the cause, because it could
have been caused by another event and because it may continue
to exist when the cause has ceased to exist. But the set of events
or states which is the ‘sufficient condition’ for the effect is exis-
tentially dependent upon the effect. So that at cause necessitates
its effect is spelled out by Ingarden in terms of existential depen-
dence. If x caused y, then x is the last one of a set of events, c,
which together are existentially dependent on y. c cannot occur
without y occurring. It is impossible that c occurs but y does
not.
Of course, as Ingarden is not an empiricist, the impossibility
meant here is not a linguistic or logical one but purely ontolog-
ical. (62) There is no contradiction between ‘c occurred’ and ‘y
6For the names of the various kinds of existential dependence I use Peter
Simons’ translation (in Ginsberg 1931, p. 263). An English translation of
the relevant parts of Streit I is (Ingarden 1964b).
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did not occur’. c is existentially dependent upon y because of
the ‘material essence’ (19) of the cause and of the effect. That
is, because of what the cause and the effect are, because of the
qualities that are involved in these events. By this, Ingarden also
rejects the view that the necessity in causation is grounded in
laws. ‘Laws have themselves no power over things’ (60), they
only describe things.
So Ingarden assumes that there is a real connection between an
immediate cause and its effect, and he specifies exactly what it
is: it is one of necessitation through existential dependence. The
cause, together with certain other events, drags the effect into be-
ing with necessity and thus without delay. Therefore immediate
causes are simultaneous with their effect.
2.4 Persisting in time
How does Ingarden do justice to the impression that often effects
occur later than their causes, for example when an earthquake
causes a tidal wave? He spells this out in terms of ‘mediate’
causes, which are connected with each other through processes.
That x at time t1 was a mediate cause of z at time t2 means that x
was the last part of a set of events which together were a sufficient
condition for an event y at t1 which is connected with z through a
process. Processes for Ingarden are not causal. What else could
they be? They are a matter of something simply staying the
same, carrying on through time. When a thing persists in time,
it moves ‘from one present to another present’ (72). This is not a
matter of causation: the existence of a thing at one time is not a
cause of the existence of that thing at a later time. (73) Persisting
through time or ‘remaining in being’ occurs because there is in
things an inclination to carry on (73, also 116).
Not only the persistence of things consists in simple ‘remaining
in being’ (73), also (some or all) other processes do. Ingarden’s
11
example is a thing that moves in a straight line. No Forces are
necessary for the continuation of the movement. It is the same
movement at all times during a certain period. The movement
is a changeless process which just remains in being. Ingarden
calls that a homogenous process. A stage of such a process is,
according to Ingarden, not a cause of the later stages. ‘The later
phases of that which simply remains in being are not effects of
the earlier phases of that which remains in being.’ (73)
So causation in the strict sense is a simultaneous relation.
What relates a mediate cause and its effect is that something
persists identically through time. If there were no diachronic
identity, if nothing were to carry on identically through time,
then world history would not be spread out over time but would
collaps into one moment. (40, 121) ‘The processes which mediate
between events and make them to relata of mediate causal rela-
tions, introduce the difference of time between them.’ (121) For
Ingarden causing is something distinct from persisting identically
through time. The former is simultaneous, the latter stretches
over time.7
7I have simplified Ingarden’s view. While on p. 40 Ingarden writes that
processes introduce the time difference between a mediate cause and its effect,
on pp. 47, 72, 113, and 122 he writes that a mediate cause can be connected
with its effect either through something remaining in the same state over
some time or through a ‘homogeneous process’. So here he is using a narrow
concept of a process which does not include a thing’s carrying on through
time. By a homogeneous process (‘gleichförmiger Vorgang’) Ingarden means
one that develops without change, i.e. without being affected by some ‘force’
(116). An inhomogeneous process is one that changes through some force
acting on it. Among the inhomogeneous processes Ingarden distinguishes
between those that are changing continuously, through a constant force, and
those on which at different times different forces are acting. (118) However,
while Ingarden says clearly that homogeneous processes consist in simple
remaining in being and that therefore a stage of it is not a cause of the
later stages, he does not say clearly whether a stage of a non-homogeneous
process is a cause of the later stages. He should admit that, as they are not
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3 Objections to Ingarden
I shall now raise objections, before I shall then argue that there
are important insights in Ingarden’s theory and develop a theory
which takes the objections as well as the insights into account.
The first objection against Ingarden’s theory is that it is false
that causes are simulaneous with their effects. We should clarify
what this objection is about. On what does it depend whether it
is false to say that causes are simultaneous with their effects? On
how we use the term ‘cause’? Or something more objective or
deeper? I suggest that it first depends on which cases we usually
call cases of causation, and then on how these cases are objec-
tively. In many or even all cases where we call an event the cause
of another event, the cause is earlier than its effect. For exam-
ple, the earthquake caused the tidal wave, moving the light switch
caused the lightening of the light bulb, the movement of billard
ball A caused the movement of billard ball B. These are amongst
the clearest and most typical cases of event causation. Even if
Ingarden is right in his assumption that there are cases of on-
tological dependence between simultaneous events, the question
is whether these are or should be taken to be cases of causation
in the narrowest sense, and then whether all cases of causation
involve existential dependence.
Consider an earthquake in the sea causing a tidal wave. Are
there simultaneous events which are ontologically dependent on
each other? Ingarden would say that the beginning of the move-
ment of the ground is simultaneous with, and causes, the begin-
ning of the movement of the water. Further, he would say that
there is a causal relation between processes: the process of the
movement of the ground causes the process of the movement of
changeless, they are causal, but that would be difficult to reconcile with his
thesis that cause and effect are simultaneous or connected through non-causal
processes.
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the water. As the earth and the water are clearly two different
things, Ingarden’s claim that the movement of the ground and the
movement of the water are distinct events or processes is true. It
is also true that they are existentially dependent on each other:
the movement of the ground cannot occur without the movement
of the water. As the ground and the water cannot occupy the
same place, the ground cannot move without accelerating and
removing the water. Thus in some cases there are simultaneous
events which are ontologically dependent on each other. And it
is natural to say that the movement of the ground ‘caused’ the
movement of the water.
But now consider a lake, A, with a flood gate. When the
floodgate is opened at time t1, then the water starts to flow into
another lake, B. At time t2 A is empty and B is full. Event O, the
opening of the flood gate, was a mediate cause of event F, which
is lake B being full at t2. Is there an event simultaneous with
O on which O is existentially dependent and which is connected
with F through a process? There is some event at t1 on which O
is existentially dependent, but it is not connected with F through
a process. Every movement of a thing x is existentially dependent
upon the simultaneous movement of the thing y which occupied
the space to which x moves. But when y is not involved in the
process leading to the later event, z, of which x is a mediate
cause, then Ingarden’s model of mediate causation fails. Not all
causation occurs through simultaneous causation.
To see a further problem with Ingarden’s theory, consider a
universe with two bodies, A and B, moving away from each other
until through the gravitational force between them at time t1
they are at rest. Then they accelerate through the gravitational
force towards each other. At time t2 they have velocity v2 (let
us assume that they have equal masses, then they have the same
velocity at t2), and at t3 they hit each other with velocity v3. In
this case it is true to say that the bodies’ hitting each other with
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v3 at t3 was caused by the bodies’ movement and their masses
and their distance at t2. Again, the problem with Ingarden’s
theory is that the movement at t2 is not existentially dependent
upon some event which is involved in a process leading to the
collision.
A further problem is that the process leading to the colli-
sion can hardly be analysed as consisting in something persist-
ing changelessly and identically through time. Ingarden’ line of
thought is: a cause in the strict sense necessitates its effect; no
event can necessitate a later event; the phases of something that
persists changelessly and identically through time do not cause
the later phases. His defense for taking the constant, unaccel-
erated movement of a body to consist in something persisting
identically through time and not as causal is that the process is
changeless. There is no force acting on it. Even if we granted
that, in this example Ingarden would have no defense for his claim
that causation is simultaneous and that processes are non-causal.
There is a force acting continuously on the bodies, and the force
is changing continuously. The process is not changeless in any
way. Against Ingarden, we have to say that in this case there is
no simultaneous causation and furthermore that the process does
not consist in something persisting identically through time.
4 The necessity assumption
The reason for which Ingarden claims that immediate causes are
simultaneous with their effects and that all causation involves
immediate causation is his assumption that an effect must be ne-
cessitated. For every effect there is an ‘active sufficient condition’
(53), in the sense that there is a set of events or states of af-
fairs (including the cause) which cannot occur without the effect
occurring. From this Ingarden concludes that the effect cannot
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occur later than the cause. I shall now argue that this conclu-
sion is correct but that a cause (or some set of events containing
it) does not necessitate its effect. Let me add to Ingarden’s ar-
gument that if two events occur at different times, then there
cannot be a ‘connection of being’ between them, the following
brief argument.
If A and B are point events, then there can occur an event
after A and before B which prevents the occurrence of B. If A
and B are temporally extended and B begins later than A begins
and ends later than A ends, then A cannot necessitate B either.
After the beginning of A an event can occur which prevents the
beginning of B. Even the occurrence of the whole event A cannot
necessitate B because after the end of A – let us call this time t2
something can occur which prevents the occurrence of a part of
B, and then it is not true anymore that B occurred. One might
object that if such an event occurred, then it had a cause at
time t2 which is incompatible with an event which is a part of
A. But the event which prevents B may occur as the result of an
indeterministic (probabilistic) process. So at t2 there could be an
indeterministic processes going on which could develop so that it
collides with the process coming from A and prevents B. However
big you make A, it cannot exclude that. Furthermore, there could
be a free agent who brings about after t2 an event which prevents
B who prevents B directly. However big you make A, it cannot
exclude that, because at t2 there is nothing which determines
whether such an action will occur. Of course, there might be no
be free agents, but the mere possibility of their existence makes it
already false that A necessitates B. The only way to exclude that
B is prevented from occurring is to add ‘and nothing prevents
B from occurring’. But ‘It is impossible that A occurs while B
does not occur and nothing prevents B from occurring’ is not
correctly expressed by saying that A necessitates B. No event
necessitates a later event. Of course, when there is, as a matter
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of fact, nothing which could prevent an effect from occurring,
then the effect will occur. But the necessitation thesis makes the
stronger claim that if the complete cause occurs, nothing could
prevent the occurrence of the effect. This leads to the idea that
deterministic causal processes cannot be stopped. That this idea
has been accepted by many philosophers is proven by the fact
that many philosophers reject free will because they assume that
there is a conflict between causation and free will.
That an event cannot necessitate a later event is a correct
and important insight of Ingarden. But why should we accept
Ingarden’s assumption that a cause, or a ‘sufficient condtion’,
necessitates the effect? Cases like ‘The earthquake caused the
tidal wave’ or ‘The spark caused the explosion’ are paradigm
cases of causation, and there the cause is earlier than the effect.
This shows not only that in the paradigm cases of causation the
cause does not necessitate the effect, it also shows that we do
not mean by ‘cause’ that it necessitates its effect. I have no
explanation why so many philosophers assumed that a (complete)
cause necessitates its effect The only reason for thinking that a
cause necessitates its effect which I can see is that by ‘A caused B’
we imply that A as well as B occurred, so if A occurred but not B,
then A was not a cause of B. But this so obviously does not entail
that a cause necessitates its effect that I can hardly believe that
anybody accepted the necessitation thesis for that reason. Let us
see if we find an adequate theory of causation if we assume that
cases like ‘The earthquake caused the tidal wave’ are paradigm
cases of causation and that causes do not necessitate their effects.
5 Tendencies
Ingarden mentions himself what in my view is the key to the cor-
rect understanding of event causation. Describing what persist-
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ing through time is, Ingarden says that there is a certain ‘inertia’
(‘Trägheit’) in things, an ‘inclination to carry on’ (‘Neigung zum
Weiterbestehen’) (73, similarly p. 116). Consider the universe
described above with just two bodies moving towards each other
at time t2. Now ask the question: How will that universe, U,
carry on after t2? It could carry on in many ways. Every possi-
ble state of a universe is what could come after t2. There could
be after t2 a universe with just five bodies, one which is as ours
was in 1894 at noon, or there could be no universe at all. But
all these possibilities are unlikely. What will be there after t2, if
God does not cease to sustain the universe and if nothing else in-
terferes, is two bodies moving towards each other. Why? Why is
this possible way of carrying on so much more likely than any of
the other innumberable possible ways of carrying on? Because of
that which Ingarden calls an ‘inclination’ in things. But, contrary
to Ingarden, there are not only inclinations towards carrying on
changelessly and identically. In our example there is at t2 an
inclination towards carrying on with two bodies moving towards
each other with a certain increasing velocity and an increasing
rate of increasing (because the force gets stronger the closer the
bodies move towards each other).
Following John Stuart Mill (1843, p. 3.10.5), I call such incli-
nations ‘tendencies’. Tendencies towards the world carrying on
in a certain way. Which way can be specified by specifying a
later states of affairs towards which the tendency is pointing. In
the case described there is at time t2 a tendency T towards there
being two bodies at certain positions at time t3. However, we
should say that the same tendency is also a tendency towards
there being two bodies at certain positions at a certain time be-
tween t2 and t3. Any tendency at time t1 towards S at t2, is also
a tendency towards certain states of affairs at any time between
t1 and t2.
It is important to distinguish ‘tendency’ in this technical sense
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from tendencies which are ascribed to a thing or substance. One
can use ‘The body has a tendency towards moving to position
B’ for ‘There is a tendency towards the body being at position
B at time t’, but tendencies are not borne by and do not inhere
in substances. Usually there is not just one substance on which
a tendency is based, and of the substances which are involved in
the basis of a tendency only some of its properties are relevant.
In the example given, the masses and the distance of the two
bodies is relevant whilst their temperature and their colour are
not. Therefore tendencies are based on states of affairs, which are
specified by saying which properties of which things are relevant.
When the world carries on following tendency T towards S so
that S occurs, we say that T is realised. There is then a process
leading from T’s basis to S.
However, a tendency need not be realised. For example when
there is at t1 a tendency T towards S and at t1 another tendency
T’, based on another state of affairs, towards a state of affairs that
is incompatible with S, then only one of two tendencies can be
realised. The processes following T and T’ then cross each other.
More generally, when something brings about an event which
is incompatible with the realisation of tendency T, then we can
say that the realisation of T was prevented, that T was interfered
with, or that something intervened in T or in the process following
T.
We can distinguish tendencies of various strengths. The strongest
kind of tendency is one for which it is true that it is impossible
that it is not realised although nothing intervened with T. That
is, it is impossible that just by chance it is not realised. This we
can call a deterministic tendency, a process following a determin-
istic tendency we can call a deterministic process. By contrast,
an indeterministic tendency is one which can fail to be realised
without there being something which prevents its realisation. It
just fails to be realised. There is a certain probability that it will
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not be realised. Indeterministic tendencies lead to probabilistic
processes.
This notion of a deterministic process differs from the usual no-
tion of determinism and of a deterministic process. Determinism,
as usually understood, is the thesis that every event is necessi-
tated by antecedent events. According to the usual notion, a
deterministic notion is non-stoppable. But as events cannot be
necessitated by antecedent events and as there cannot be non-
stoppable processes, we do not need these notions and can use
the word ‘deterministic’ more usefully in the sense defined. Deter-
minism then is the view that there are no probabilistic processes.
Newtonian physics, for example, is in this sense deterministic,
because it describes no probabilistic processes.
6 Causation
We can now describe what is the case where there is event cau-
sation. Where a tendency is realised, there is a process, a causal
process. Causation is not to be understood in terms of pairs of
cause and effect and of causal chains, but in terms of processes.
A cause is connected with its effect through a process.
While a process can be stopped, when we say ‘A caused B’
we are implying that the process leading from A to B was not
stopped. We can now say what causation is:
(C) In typical cases where x caused y, x was the basis of a
tendency towards B and the tendency was realised.
I say in (C) only ‘in typical cases of causation’ and not ‘in all
cases’ because we say also for example that the ball fell into the
pocket because the other ball just missed it. The other ball did
not do anything, it was not involved in any process leading to
the effect. So we sometimes say truly that A caused B although
A was not involved in a process leading to B. We can call this
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passive or negative causation. And of course we often call not
events but free agents the cause of some event. When I freely
throw a stone into a window, then I can truly be said to be
the cause of the breaking of the window although I am not the
basis of a tendency leading to the effect. So perhaps we can
say instead of ‘typical cases’ ‘all cases of active, positive event
causation’. But in any case (C) is not designed to be a definition
of the concept of a cause but a description of what is the case in
typical cases of causation. If we want to call it a definition we
can call it a ‘real definition’ instead of a ‘nominal definition’. But
because it does not just say what we mean by a ‘cause’ it is more
suitably called it a description or theory of causation. In this it
is similar to Ingarden’s theory of causation. But while Ingarden
claimed that an effect has to be necessitated through existential
dependence and hence that a cause has to be simultaneous with
its effect, I have suggested that not existential dependence but
the ‘inclinations’ whose existence Ingarden also recognises are the
mechanism of causation.8
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